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## THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC

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What I have to say about our policy in the Pacific is based entirely upon considerations of our material interests. I do not lose sight for one moment of the importance of the so-called higher motives. They, however, are often only the emanations of material interests; in any event they are so elusive as to escape accurate analysis and must be left to the treatment of speculative writers.

The choice of a wise policy is hardly more important than the faithful and continued adherence to it when once decided upon. In the competition of great powers today, prestige is a very important factor, and vacillation in a country's foreign policy is most disastrous to its prestige.

Before we can formulate the policy of the United States in the Pacific we must ask ourselves what are our material needs and interests. What are we after? Do we want an outlet for emigration? No. Do we want land? Emphatically no. We want to make money; that is, we want to develop our trade with the countries bordering on the Pacific. We want to share in the prestige and the pecuniary advantages to be derived from helping in the industrial development of China. We are looking for a remunerative field for the investment of our surplus capital and a market for our manufactures, besides opportunities for our technical experts. All these advantages, in addition to what we shall gain from a larger importation of Chinese commodities, are our aims in the Pacific.

Of all regions in the world, China offers the greatest possibilities in this field. China is the key of the whole political situation in the Pacific. She is one of the principal factors in shaping the world policies of the great powers; and their efforts to secure commercial advantages have caused the keenest rivalry among them. The simplest method for a power to benefit commercially from a country is to secure its political control and manipulate its governmental

machinery so as to constitute a virtual monopoly of its trade and industrial development. This is the method which China's neighbors, Japan and Russia, have pursued in acquiring control of Manchuria and Mongolia. France has established herself to the south in Indo-China. Germany holds Kiao-Chau and looks upon the province of Shantung as accessory to that port. Great Britain has Hong Kong and claims a primary interest in the valley of the Yangtze in the event of a breakup of the Chinese empire. The United States alone of the great powers of the earth has had no territorial ambitions in China, nor sought to acquire the political control of one foot of Chinese soil. Our traditions and our economic situation have opposed such an attempt. We are well situated for carrying on our commerce across the sea and enjoy a high degree of civilization and industrial development. We have no need, therefore, of privileges or preferential treatment to secure our share in the commercial advantages offered by China. Hence we are opposed to the policy of partition or establishment of spheres of influence. We demand a field free for all. This is the policy of the open door, the maintenance of which we consider so important that we are ready to support it, if necessary, by force.

Now since the principal purpose of any new acquisition of Chinese territory would be commercial advantage, this policy of the open door has acted as a barrier to any such attempt. For what country would make the sacrifices to secure the control of territory, the opening up of which might bring no greater benefit to herself than to the other powers?

The consequence of this attitude of the United States is to secure us the sympathy of China, for she realizes the fundamental importance of our policy of the open door in helping her to preserve her political integrity and autonomy. The resulting confidence and friendship between the two governments is an everpresent—almost a controlling factor—in the actual diplomacy of the Far East.

So much for the positive side of our policy in the Pacific. But what are our apprehensions? What dangers do we foresee? We fear the competition of the Asiatic coolie. Those regions exposed to Chinese and Japanese immigration are united in considering the policy of exclusion a vital necessity. For the American laborer cannot meet the unrestricted competition of the Chinese coolie. The policy of the United States government based on popular approval must and

will exclude Chinese and Japanese laborers, even should this policy lead to war. But just as a corollary of our policy of the open door was found to be our friendship with China, so our policy of exclusion unites us in sympathy with Canada and Australia, no less determined than we, to protect themselves from Asiatic immigration. Having here a permanent basis for the maintenance of a common policy, we should endeavor to eliminate, in a spirit of mutual compromise, all minor grounds of difference. Canada and Australia, loyal as they are to the mother country, would throw over their allegiance rather than open their gates to Chinese immigration.

In the long years of our diplomatic relations with China, this question of exclusion has caused no little irritation. But now that we are determined to adhere to this policy, distasteful as it is to China, she takes into account the friendly diplomatic support our government has afforded her, and accepts the matter as no longer open to discussion. All China now asks is the admission of her merchants and students, and from this only advantage can result. Years hence when the Chinese government becomes more dependent upon popular demands, her laboring classes may force a policy of active opposition to their exclusion from other lands.

But China is not the only country affected by our policy of exclusion. There is the Japanese empire, which, however, has not the compensations which China finds elsewhere in our support of her policy. Quite the contrary. Japan finds us in her path at every turn. She might not object so seriously to our advocacy of the open door, provided the application were not made to Manchuria, which she holds by cession of Russia's twenty-five year lease, expiring in 1923. The fear that the United States will encourage China to assert her sovereign rights at the expiration of this lease was sufficient to reconcile Japan with Russia and led to the formation of an agreement for combined opposition against any attempt of the United States to support China in an effort to regain sovereignty over territory which has escaped from her control. Again in the Philippines the island empire finds rich possessions which but for the protection of the United States might be exploited for the benefit of the Mikado's subjects. Her own great naval strength—paramount in Chinese waters—would have made it possible easily to occupy and defend those islands. Turning toward Mexico she encounters an American veto of concessions made her in that country. In Korea, even, the

success of American missionaries has irritated her. The missionaries assert that the recent sanguinary repression of political conspiracies is nothing but an attempt to crush out Christianity. As if this were not enough, the proudest nation in the world, victor in one of the greatest wars of modern times, finds her subjects excluded from our territory, while illiterate and poverty-stricken immigrants from all parts of Europe are welcomed. It is in vain that the statesmen of the two countries refer to the opening up of Japan as a result of the never-to-be-forgotten mission of Commodore Perry, or recall that the United States was the first country willing to give up consular jurisdiction over its citizens in the Mikado's empire. Japan sees and appreciates the real situation; she wants to remain friends with the United States but her national pride demands she be excluded not by discriminations of race, but only on general grounds applicable to all immigrants. Aside from the sentimental consideration of national pride, America presents great opportunities for intelligent Japanese to amass wealth, and so develop the financial strength and taxable resources of the empire. The situation between the two countries is further embittered by a difference as to the rights which the Japanese enjoy by treaty stipulation to hold land in this country.

We are then face to face with Japan; the atmosphere is charged with electricity. The flash may come at any moment; but it does not seem likely that any such terrible disaster will occur; and one of the principal reasons is the similarity of our situation with Canada and Australia. As we have seen they fear Asiatic immigration even more than we do. Their urgent representations have impressed British statesmen with the necessity of helping them to maintain their policy of exclusion. Consequently Great Britain, the ally of Japan, is ready to go to great lengths to prevent a conflict between her ally and this country over the question; the more so as the last few years have strengthened the cordial understanding between the two English-speaking nations—an understanding which is so important an influence for peace and civilization throughout the world.

Japan will not attack us. If she had intended to strike she would have done so before the completion of the Panama Canal. But may we not question our justification in so vigorously supporting China's very natural desire to regain Manchuria and Mongolia? Might not a friend to China point out the advantages of Japanese and Russian control of these sparsely settled and as yet undeveloped provinces?

Capital, protected by Japanese and Russian credit, will flow in, Chinese merchants will reap a rich harvest, Chinese coolies will swarm over the land and increase the Chinese population manyfold. When all this has been accomplished, China, if she has been able to maintain a firm government capable of solving the difficult problems that face her in the vast territories remaining, will find it possible to regain her lost provinces by peaceful cession or by martial conquest.

In Mexico we can of course tolerate no interference on the part of Japan. She will never be allowed to retain any privileged position nor to establish settlements sufficiently populous to exercise any political influence. But would we be justified in helping the weaker states of South America to repel Japanese immigration? If we hold aloof, these states will of themselves react against an Asiatic invasion, and we shall have supporters in our policy of exclusion. We shall have behind us the strength of the united public sentiment of the two Americas.

Returning to the Philippines: are we justified in protecting inferior races—some of them among the lowest in the scale of human development—from the competition of that magnificent industrial machine, the Asiatic coolie? The European cannot multiply in these tropical islands; why then should we bar them to our brother race, fitted to supplant the Filipino as we have supplanted the red man? The answer is this: we must do it in the interest of the balance of power. China is likely some day to become the greatest power in existence, and the inevitable law of political development will draw all other powers together to check her supremacy. It would then be too late to pluck from her grasp these precious islands. As regards Japan, however, the situation is not quite the same. Japan, with poor soil, more limited population, and ruinous taxation, is never likely to become a menace to other nations. Our exclusion of the Japanese rests upon the exigencies of the present situation. There is also the possibility of Japan's making common cause with China at some future period.

We realize that this exclusion policy in the Philippines can be maintained only by a powerful navy. Unless it should secure the support of other European countries, it would have to be abandoned whenever the United States passed through a period of political embarrassment. An effective neutralization of the Philippines would obviate this danger. At present, however, such a solution does not seem feasible.

Great emphasis should be laid on the fundamental importance of a consistent adhesion to the policy of the open door. Our vigorous support of China in this direction should be balanced by the firm maintenance of our exclusion policy, vital not only to ourselves but also to our kindred communities, Canada and Australia. A powerful navy should protect our possessions in the Philippines, but we should cultivate the friendship of Japan and show our good will by refusing to embroil ourselves in the Manchurian question. We should refrain from interfering with her immigration to South America. After all, the world policy of the United States is based upon friendship with Great Britain and a determination to keep open a fair field for our commercial enterprise within the territories of South America, Asia and parts of Africa. On this continent it is called the Monroe Doctrine; in China, the open door; but the result is the same: to protect the weak; to lend them our support when in danger; and to help them to maintain their political integrity. Other considerations, it is true, enter into the Monroe Doctrine; but this purpose is a fundamental part of the doctrine comparable in its results with the policy of the open door.

Everywhere then we find the policy of the United States one of friendship—support of others, asking only a fair field for all. We are not bound by entangling alliances which Washington's farewell message bade us avoid, but our diplomatic coöperation with Great Britain and China is based on a deeper and safer foundation—permanent common interests and mutual confidence.

In conclusion—We have found the two cardinal principles of American policy in the Pacific to be: (1) The open door in China; (2) exclusion of Asiatic immigrants. A corollary of the principle of the open door is our friendship with China, while the danger of coolie immigration unites us in bonds of sympathy with other countries of European blood and traditions whose possessions border on the Pacific. Our Philippine policy is determined by our actual relations with Japan and by subconscious, almost instinctive, apprehensions that the most populous political entity of the world may become a danger to the independence of other states, should her teeming millions acquire and settle new regions of such strategic and economic importance as the islands ceded us by Spain.